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Armed groups tax. Journalistic accounts often include a tone of surprise about this fact, while 
policy reports tend to strike a tone of alarm, highlighting the link between armed group 
taxation and ongoing conflict. Policymakers often focus on targeting the mechanisms of 
armed group taxation as part of their conflict strategy, often described as ‘following the 
money’. We argue that what is instead needed is a deeper understanding of the nuanced 
realities of armed group taxation, the motivations behind it, and the implications it has for an 
armed group’s relationship with civilian and diaspora populations, as well as the broader 
international community. This paper builds on two distinct literatures, on armed groups and 
on taxation, to provide the first systematic exploration into the motivation of armed group 
taxation. Based on a review of the diverse practices of how armed groups tax, we highlight 
that a full account of their motivation needs to go beyond revenue collection, and engage 
with key themes around legitimacy, population control, institution building, and the 
performance of public authority. We problematise common approaches towards armed group 
taxation and state-building, and outline key questions of a new research agenda.  
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In downtown Myitkyina, small shops pay a tax of around MMK 1 million [c. US$720] to 
the KIO/A per year. But it’s not done very systematically. Sometimes they come twice 
per year, sometimes once per year. Private car owners have to pay at checkpoints. If 
they give you a receipt, you can use it for a year. But if you have a receipt from the 
KIO/A and the government finds it, you may get arrested. And the government is 
collecting taxes too. So most people in the city pay to the KIO/A and the government. 
Resident of (government-controlled) Myitkyina, Myanmar, 7 January 2018 
 
The Taliban tax everything. They get money from the vehicles that cross the district or 
are going from one district to another. They collect tax on the crops of the farmers, 
which is called Usher... I give my Zakat and Usher to them too. 
Resident of Pashtunkot District, Faryab Province, Afghanistan, 17 February 2019 
 
Introduction 
Armed groups tax. Almost one third of the ‘violent non-state organizations’ included in the 
‘Big, Allied and Dangerous’ (BAAD) Dataset participated in some form of resource collection 
from businesses or communities, and Albert (2020) finds that civilian taxation is the most 
prevalent governance activity in the Rebel Quasi-State Institution Dataset (Walsh, Conrad 
and Whitaker 2018; Albert 2020: 15). Journalistic accounts often include a tone of surprise 
about both this fact and the effectiveness of some armed groups’ taxing practices, 
marvelling, for instance, that ‘Al-Shabab “collects more revenue than government”’ (Harper 
2020) or examining ‘How ISIS Is Using Taxes to Build a Terrorist State’ (Thorndike 2014). At 
the same time, policy reports tend to strike a tone of alarm, highlighting the link between 
armed group taxation and ongoing conflict (e.g. Keatinge 2014; Lister 2014; Okello 2020). As 
described by Di Cosmo, Fassin and Pinaud (2021: 8) ‘Because the collection of revenues is 
supposed to be the exclusive prerogative of the state, when a non-state group begins to tax 
the citizens living on territories nominally under a state’s sovereignty, such an action is 
regarded by most analysts as both illegal and illegitimate, that is, mere extortion’ (see also 
Mampilly 2021). Following from this, policymakers tend to focus on targeting the mechanisms 
of armed group taxation as part of their conflict strategy, often described as ‘following the 
money’ (Croissant and Barlow 2007). As responses to the potential ramifications of armed 
group taxation, however, shock and awe are insufficient, often not leading to deeper attempts 
to understand the nuanced and diverse realities of armed group taxation, the motivations 
behind it, and the implications it has for an armed group’s relationship with civilian and 
diaspora populations, as well as the broader international community. 
 
In this paper, we explore the central question of why armed groups tax.1 While there has 
been increasing scholarly and policy attention to how non-state armed groups finance 
themselves, less attention has been given to the motivations behind different armed group 
revenue generation strategies. Though a growing body of academic work engages with the 
politics and motivations of armed group taxation (Revkin 2020; Sabates-Wheeler and 
Verwimp 2014; Mampilly and Thakur forthcoming; Mampilly 2021), many policy analysts 
continue to assume that armed groups are driven purely by revenue motivations, reflecting 
longstanding assumptions about the role of ‘greed’ in driving conflict. Indeed, Mampilly 
(2021: 77) notes that the dominant paradigm in studying armed group taxation is undergirded 
by ‘the belief that rebels only engage in taxation to generate revenue’. These ideas of 
economic determinism, however, often lack nuance, and fail to capture the diversity and 
breadth of the motivations leading armed groups to levy taxes on civilian populations.  
 
 
1  Following conventional understandings, we define armed groups as (i) armed organisations willing and capable of using 
violence in pursuit of their objectives that are (ii) not fully integrated into formalised state institutions such as regular 




At the same time, the limited academic literature that exists tends to focus on evidence from 
single case studies, while including a bias towards taxation of elites rather than broader 
civilian populations (Mampilly 2021: 86). A central contribution of this paper is in bringing 
together and reviewing disparate case studies and anecdotal accounts of wide-ranging types 
of armed group taxation to illustrate both the diversity of the motivations underpinning the 
revenue generation strategies of armed groups and to identify themes and patterns that 
emerge across diverse contexts. To do so, we have systematically reviewed scholarly, policy, 
and journalistic accounts of the taxation strategies of 41 armed groups across diverse 
geographical contexts and reflecting considerable variation in the ways groups collect taxes, 
if at all.2 Our empirical strategy is explicitly exploratory – it is not intended to show the relative 
frequency of particular tax arrangements or highlight statistically significant patterns. Instead, 
we review diverse cases of armed group tax arrangements to inductively draw inferences 
about the diversity of motivations that underly them. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the meaning of taxation in relation to armed groups is complex and 
contested. Revenue extraction exists on a spectrum ranging from ‘simple plunder, to 
protection rackets, to the material reciprocation of the recognition of rights’ (Hoffmann, 
Vlassenroot and Marchais 2016: 1434). While we further reflect on these conceptual 
challenges in the conclusion, we approach armed group taxation with the recognition that 
revenue extraction by armed groups is embedded in social institutions and exists on a 
spectrum of authority, ranging from coercive to consensual, with some forms of extraction 
looking more like state-like taxation and others looking more like extortion. We follow 
scholars of rebel governance in distinguishing informal taxation and revenue generation from 
corruption and extortion by emphasising taxation’s foundation in ‘publicly known rules and 
procedures’ while being justified on public interest grounds (Revkin 2020).3 
 
Through this exploration, we illustrate that armed group taxation is not only driven by 
economic motives. We argue for greater nuance in the analysis of revenue collection by 
armed groups and show that motivations for taxation are multifaceted. No single motive – 
whether revenue, ideology, control, legitimacy, institution- or state-building – can alone 
provide a sufficient account of why armed groups tax. As with state taxation, taxation by 
armed groups relates to a broad set of political motivations and strategic interests and can 
enable multiple interrelated outcomes. Taxation underpins organisational capacity and the 
capacity to wage conflict but is also central to the relationship between armed groups and 
local populations and the logics of internal organisation and institutional structure. 
Meanwhile, the motivations for armed group taxation are deeply intertwined with the broader 
objectives of the group. Armed groups may pursue a diversity of objectives,4 which may 
 
2  We examined 41 cases of armed groups, the majority of which engaged in some form of levying taxes, though some 
groups that did not appear to tax were also included. For each group, we reviewed types of taxes collected; taxed 
constituencies; group characteristics like goals, ideology, age, and size; relationships to the state; tax collection 
mechanisms; compliance mechanisms; other non-tax sources of revenue; and use of tax, including goods or services 
rendered in exchange for tax revenue. The cases include groups that were founded from 1949–2012, with the exception 
of Camorra which is estimated to have been founded in the 17th century, though is still active today. We also included 
additional case examples, drawn from previously published work. For a list of all cases included in this paper, please 
see the appendix.  
3  Revkin (2020) notes that tax-like payments are ‘justified on public interest grounds (financing public goods, paying for 
the costs of war, redistributing assets from rich to poor) whereas theft is justified only by a self-serving desire for private 
gain’. Rules, meanwhile, may be publicly known through written documentation – for instance, Richani (2013: 68) 
describes how the FARC has applied written codes of taxation since 1996 – as well as through oral or other social 
channels. In explaining how the tax policies of the Maoist insurgency in eastern India differed from organised crime, for 
example, a Maoist rebel official clarified that, ‘This is not corruption. This is taxation... We have rules and norms around 
how we tax people… We also have rules and norms around how we use the fund[s] collected. So we are not simply 
collecting money for private gain – that would be corruption’ (cited in Chakravarti 2014: 150). Some scholars 
nevertheless describe this as ‘institutionalized’ extraction (Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 2014). 
4  For instance, groups can pursue economic and political goals, such as leftist, ethno-nationalist or religious based 
desires for a change in the status quo. These goals may also be more specific, like the toppling of an incumbent leader 
or regime or the establishment of a de facto or proto-state. More specifically, objectives may include (1) 




change over time, and which may be pursued through a wide range of strategic and 
operational dimensions, of which taxation can be an important one. 
 
As the remainder of this paper argues, taxation certainly provides material resources for 
armed groups and some groups are likely primarily motivated by revenue concerns. 
However, taxation also reinforces ideology, builds legitimacy with civilian populations, builds 
institutions that enable various objectives (including but not limited to increased autonomy or 
secession), serves as a way to control and administer populations, and acts as a key way to 
perform and project public authority. In the rest of the paper, we outline the various ways in 
which taxation serves a strategic purpose for armed groups – to unpack why they tax and 
how tax relates to their institutional structure and relationships with civilians.5 
 
In drawing attention to the ways in which armed groups tax for more than revenue purposes, 
we complicate theories of taxation and state-building. In considering armed group taxation 
we advise against a deterministic or teleological approach that assumes a link between the 
mechanisms of taxation and the institutional forms that armed groups are working towards. 
While the taxing motivations of armed groups are thus deeply linked to their objectives, this 
relationship is not always purely material, teleological or focused only on stated or long-term 
objectives. 
 
We conclude by highlighting the policy implications of the multifaceted motivations for armed 
group taxation, identifying remaining knowledge gaps in understanding armed group 
taxation, and suggesting questions for a new research agenda on armed group taxation.  
 
 
1  Armed group taxation, revenue, and conflict 
 
Among the most obvious reasons why armed groups engage in taxation is to secure revenue 
to support their operational objectives, sustain their survival, or secure profits. Over the past 
two decades, the opportunity for material gains has been the most popular framework to 
understand rebel taxation practices, influenced by theories of the ways in which greed 
influences broader conflict motivations (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Shaped by the ideas of 
Collier and Hoeffler, armed groups came to be viewed as quasi-criminal, profit-motivated 
actors (Mampilly 2021: 78). Indeed, views on taxation in conflict-affected areas ‘were 
dominated by the “greed’”’ literature of the early 2000s, which largely framed taxation during 
conflict as predatory and violent’ and primarily driven by the motivation to increase revenue 
(Hoffmann et al. 2016: 1435). Metelits (2009), for instance, argues that resource 
maximisation is the dominant driver of rebel group behaviours,6 while the literature on war 
economies has frequently emphasised that conflicts can be fuelled by armed groups’ desire 
for revenue expansion, for instance, by competing for control over natural resources (Le 
Billion 2006; Rettberg and Ortiz-Riomalo 2016) and foreign aid (de Waal 1997; Keen 2008). 
 
In some cases, revenue indeed appears to drive some taxing behaviours of armed groups. 
Taxation can be incredibly lucrative for armed groups, with taxation practices allegedly 
accounting for the majority of revenue for some of the largest armed groups globally, 
including al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, FARC, HTS, JNIM, ISIS, the Taliban, and armed actors 
 
rights; (5) pursuit of improved political representation or participation; (6) remove current leader; (7) democratisation; (8) 
leftist revolution; (9) implement theocracy; and (10) implement military regime (see Braithwaite 2009; San-Acka 2015). 
5  Naturally, it is difficult to judge the exact intentions and motivation of an armed group, especially when considering that 
their policies often are the result of competing interests, ideas, and sources of power within each armed group. Hence, 
the paper relies on an observation and analysis of the practices of armed groups. 
6  Specifically, they argue that insurgents restrain their violence against civilians so long as they maintain a monopoly on 
the control of resources, but if they face competition over this control, these groups will abruptly adopt more coercive 




in the DRC (Nellemann, Henriksen, Pravettoni, Schlingemann, Shaw and Reitano 2018). 
Estimates of tax revenues for these groups are in the tens of millions, with al-Shabaab, for 
example, allegedly earning between US$38–56 million at their height of tax collection in 
2012; armed groups in the DRC having been estimated to make between US$14 and US$50 
million annually on illicit charcoal taxes; and ISIS’ tax revenue often estimated to out-perform 
resource revenues, with tax revenue estimated to be between US$300–400 million and oil 
and gas revenue estimated to be between US$150–450 in the years 2014–2017 (Nellemann 
et al. 2018).7 Given the revenue potential of these taxing activities, it is therefore no surprise 
that armed groups establish extensive and robust taxing practices.  
 
Mirroring broader arguments about the relationship between taxation and resource rents 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2005), groups have also been shown to establish taxation practices 
when given lucrative opportunities.8 Specifically, the presence of natural resources can 
amplify the economic incentives to tax, given the possibilities for taxing wealthy resource 
companies and/or the highly valuable goods entering or exiting a given area. Taxing the 
production, movement, and sale of natural resources is a common taxing activity of armed 
groups. Armed groups have even shown a willingness to fight over control of trade routes for 
their tax revenue potential, such as in the CAR (Jaillon, Schouten and Kalessopo 2017) and 
Somalia (Ahmad 2017). In cases where groups are actively competing for control over 
natural resources or the ability to tax lucrative natural resources, revenue appears to be at 
least one motivating factor for taxation.  
 
The costs of war-making are also often seen as a driver of taxation. Identified in both 
analyses of contemporary conflict and historical accounts of conflict and state formation 
(Darling 1996; Elias 1994; Tilly 1985; Xu and Xu 2016), this logic may be extended to the 
financing of conflict by armed groups. For instance, Elias (1994) notes that in early modern 
Europe, feudal rulers realised that instead of relying on vassals for military service, building 
large infantries helped to win wars, but required centralised revenue generation. Similarly, 
Tilly (1990: 15) describes, ‘War and the preparation for war involved rulers in extracting the 
means of war from others who held the essential resources… and who were reluctant to 
surrender them without strong pressure or compensation.’ In Tilly’s seminal argument, war-
making requires first the elimination of internal enemies, then protection from external 
enemies, and finally revenue extraction from civilians by way of taxes in order to fund these 
protection activities (Tilly 1985). Likewise, Darling (1996) shows how tax collection in the 
Ottoman Empire during the Ottoman-Habsburg wars strengthened the Ottomans’ 
administrative capacity, and contributed to early state formation (Darling 1996). In a more 
recent example, Xu and Xu (2016) also show how conflict enabled the expansion of taxation 
by the Nationalist Government in China from 1927–1937 and 1946–1949, which led to 
increases in state revenue and, accordingly, state capacity (Xu and Xu 2016). As it did in 
these representations of state formation, taxation provides one way in which contemporary 
armed groups raise revenue to support the costs of war-making. Revenue motivations are 
clearly central to understanding armed group taxation. They do not, however, explain the full 
picture, as we illustrate below. 
  
 
7  We recognise here that these estimates are likely rough, as it is difficult to come across verifiable resource estimates in 
many cases of armed non-state actor revenue.  





2  Beyond revenue: the multifaceted 
motivations for armed group taxation 
 
While material incentives thus help explain at least some taxing behaviours of armed groups, 
this does not explain why armed groups tax even when it is not a lucrative option. While 
some taxing endeavours prove to be exceptionally lucrative – including, for example, the 
taxation of construction, resource extraction, or trade – taxing civilians is not always so 
profitable. In some cases, collected revenues do not cover the cost of collection. For 
example, in Afghanistan, A. Jackson (2018: 23) shows how the Taliban often collects small 
amounts from households for electricity that are not necessarily enough to cover the costs of 
electricity production, but rather ‘what they estimate is fair’. Similarly, Mampilly (2021: 86) 
notes that the levying of ‘token’ or ‘head’ taxes on low-income groups is ‘surprisingly 
commonplace’, despite the minimal revenues and revenue inefficiency implied by such types 
of taxes (see also van den Boogaard and Beach forthcoming). At the same time, armed 
groups tax civilians even where more lucrative sources of revenue are available. For 
example, rather than derive profits from the illicit heroin and opium trade, the KIO/A taxes 
civilians through a tax on shops and vehicles (Weigand 2020), while in Pakistan, the Tehrik-i-
Taliban (TTP) collects significant revenues through the taxation of the trade of goods, 
including narcotics, and construction projects, but also charges civilians a comparatively 
small residence tax of USD 2 per month (Acharya, Bukhari and Sulaiman 2009).9  
 
These examples suggest that revenue is not the sole motivation behind the taxing activities 
of armed groups. While material incentives tell part of the story of why armed groups tax, a 
revenue-based explanation needs to be supplemented with a wider view of what taxation can 
‘do’ for armed groups (Mampilly 2021). In addition to revenue, we consider in turn five 
interrelated and non-mutually exclusive explanations for armed group taxation, showing how 
tax may be a means of achieving ideological aims, building legitimacy, institution building, 
imposing control and legibility over territory and populations, and performing public authority 




Compared to revenue, ideology is a comparatively understudied factor influencing rebel 
revenue collection practices. Yet, few groups present themselves as being driven by ‘greed’ 
– instead, justifications for actions are typically framed with reference to objectives like 
nationalism, religious purity, or a revolutionary agenda. Ideological taxation may be seen to 
serve two main functions for rebel groups: an instrumental one, with taxation instilling 
behavioural bounds, erasing individuality and establishing a group identity that enables 
cohesion, and a normative one, with taxation helping to define acceptable behaviours and 
boundaries (Sanín and Wood 2014). Within the realm of normativity, ideology shapes how 
rebel groups derive policy and practice and their means of justifying those practices both 
internally and externally. 
 
There are clear indications that ideology shapes how revenue is collected and how these 
practices are rationalised across diverse contexts. Among Islamist movements, for example, 
taxation is often framed in Islamic tenets and language. In areas of Afghanistan under 
Taliban control, taxes are often framed as ushr (commonly interpreted as an Islamic annual 
 
9  Civilian taxation is similarly prevalent in other contexts where, despite the availability of natural resources, illicit 
economic activities, the option to tax large businesses and traders, and other spoils of war, armed groups continue to 
tax civilians. Other examples where civilian taxation is prevalent despite the availability of other non-tax sources of 





tax on land or whatever produce or harvest is being brought to market) or zakat (obligation 
on Muslims to donate 2.5 per cent of their disposable income to the poor). The payment of 
zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, is framed as not only being about obeying the Taliban, 
but about being a good Muslim, irrespective of the fact that zakat is rarely actually 
redistributed as charity by the Taliban (A. Jackson 2018). Meanwhile, some armed groups 
link taxation to their revolutionary ideology, as with the Shining Path’s tax cupos 
revolucionarios (revolutionary quota) in Peru and the NPA’s revolutionary tax in the 
Philippines (Quimpo 2014). 
 
Ideology is also instrumentalised through taxation in order to define undesirable behaviours 
or to compel civilians to demonstrate compliance with certain norms. For instance, socialist 
groups may tax luxury goods and business elites, such as the CPP-NPA in the Philippines, 
who, in line with a declared communist ideology, have focused taxation efforts on the local 
business class (Santos and Santos 2010). Similarly, the Marxist ideological orientation of the 
FARC shaped its targeting of elites through taxation (Mampilly 2021: 87). Similar dynamics 
are common with Islamist groups and taxes on alcohol or narcotics, while ideological 
motivations to control behaviour can also provide motivation for groups not to tax. Indeed, 
groups may constrain revenue generation to ensure ideological coherence. For example, the 
KIO/A has opted to forgo the potential profits that could be derived from either illicit opium 
cultivation, trade, or taxation of the production and trade of narcotics in order to limit the 
harms of drug use – as well as to undermine the Myanmar state and its alleged involvement 
in the illicit heroin and opium trade (Dan, Maran, Sadan, Meehan and Goodhand 2021; 
Weigand 2020). Meanwhile, in 2012 when Ansar Dine and its allies controlled Timbuktu, 
custom duties and taxes were banned under the claim that custom duties and tariffs were 
illicit under sharia law (Strazzari 2015: 7). However, these tactics also may have been an 
attempt to win over support and business from traders, traffickers, and smugglers, with the 
group claiming that ‘trading has returned to normal; more goods are available than before, 
and at lower prices’ (ibid.).  
 
Taxation can also be a way to operationalise ideological positions vis-à-vis the state. The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), for example, levied considerably higher local taxes 
on individuals working in government professions (Mampilly 2011; Stokke 2006). Rebels 
knew that government employees could pay, while levying more burdensome taxes on 
government employees had the dual effect of imposing a financial sanction on government 
employees and diverting government revenues to their cause (Mampilly 2011: 115). The 
Naxalite insurgency in India followed a similar pattern of levying taxes only on government 
contractors, using the revenue to finance their activities (Suykens 2015). 
 
In many instances, however, ideology appears to drive armed groups’ framing of taxation 
more than it drives the actual practice of it. The Taliban use the terminology of ushr and 
zakat loosely, for instance, which allows them to maximise the revenue they can extract 
based on prevailing local conditions while still holding on to some form of Islamic justification 
for doing so. Al-Shabaab is even more imprecise with its adaptation of Islamic taxes. While 
the entirety of its zakat collection was initially (if only very briefly) distributed to the poor, al-
Shabaab has continued to collect zakat, using its own interpretation of how much should be 
levied,10 and without necessarily redistributing that revenue for welfare purposes.11 
Meanwhile, while AQIM has imposed 30 per cent tax rates at checkpoints on some 
 
10  Al-Shabaab’s zakat is set at 2.5 per cent of the monetary value of a business (as assessed by the group) before profit. 
As the Hiraal Institute (2018: 2) note, ‘This is contrary to Islamic law, which requires that Zakah is paid as a percentage 
of what one has at the end of the financial year, after deducting all liabilities. This has led some of the more idealistic AS 
members to demand that their salaries be paid from the Zakah and not by taxes collected by the Finance Office.’ 
11  As described by the Hiraal Institute (2018: 1), ‘The first head of the Zakawaat office was Sheikh Fuad, who notoriously 
paid all the collected Zakah to the poor, leading to his immediate dismissal after his first year in the job; Al-Shabab had 




religiously forbidden goods, like cocaine, it has been argued that these levies are primarily 
motivated by profit rather than ideology (Fanusie and Entz 2017; Larémont 2011). 
 
As these examples suggest, ideological preferences are not fixed and may evolve in 
response to material circumstances. In other words, the need to generate revenue also 
shapes rebel ideology or the instrumentalisation of ideology, insofar as ideology can be 
sidelined or used to enable revenue raising activities (Dishman 2001; Rosenthal 2008). 
Ideologies themselves are often littered with contradictions, while ideological framing is often 
used pragmatically to serve the needs of an insurgency. A by-product of this fluid relationship 
is that the need for resources can create uncomfortable ideological contradictions. The 
Taliban, for example, profit from taxing the opium trade (Mansfield 2016), leaving them open 
to accusations of hypocrisy from both internal and external audiences.12 Similarly, in 
Colombia, FARC initially prohibited drug cultivation, considering it counter-revolutionary 
(Rosenthal 2008: 484), before levying a ten per cent tax on coca and poppy yields and, 
finally, becoming immersed in the drug trade themselves (Otis 2014: 3).  
 
2.2 Building legitimacy 
 
Armed group taxation can thus be motivated and shaped by non-material factors, like 
ideology. Similarly, taxation and legitimacy, understood in an empirical way as voluntary 
obedience to social control (Weber, Henderson and Parsons 1964), are deeply entwined 
concepts. While many people, rather unsurprisingly, do not enjoy paying taxes and criticise 
certain taxation policies, it is a generally accepted right of states to tax populations. Stewart 
(2015: 31) suggests that ‘the principles and practice of taxation in successful “tax states” 
have evolved interdependently with the benefit and legitimacy of government’. Indeed, 
taxation and legitimacy were co-produced in the process of state formation in Europe, with 
states successfully monopolising the legitimate use of force and the legitimate right to tax 
(Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage 1994; Bourdieu 2020; Elias 1994). In contemporary 
conflict-affected contexts, competing armed authorities, including states, armed groups, and 
other public authorities, such as strongmen or warlords, likewise frequently claim the 
legitimate use of force and the legitimate right to tax. Legitimacy considerations thus factor 
into the motivation of why armed groups tax.13 
 
Legitimacy underpins the ability of armed groups to tax populations under their control. For 
instance, the BRN in Southern Thailand collects levies – which the group refers to as 
voluntary donations – in areas with a heavy Thai army presence that limits the group’s ability 
to enforce collection coercively (Weigand 2020), indicating a degree of public support and 
legitimacy. Thakur and Mampilly (forthcoming) argue that the taxation practices of armed 
groups in Northeast India are best understood as a technology of governance, with the 
degree of legitimacy that armed groups have shaping the nature of revenue collection 
strategies. Groups with a higher degree of legitimacy use taxation in more deliberate ways to 
maintain or further their local support, resulting in what Levi (1988) describes as ‘quasi-
voluntary compliance’ of local populations. Meanwhile, groups with a lower degree of 
legitimacy have less structured approaches to taxation and, naturally, require more coercion 
to enforce compliance.  
An armed group’s interest in local legitimacy shapes not only the extent to which it is able to 
levy taxes but also the character of its taxation practices. Armed groups that want to 
construct legitimacy have to be conscious of local perceptions when demanding levies, such 
as views on what type of activities are locally accepted. For example, Hoffmann et al. (2016) 
 
12  More broadly, reliance on illicit forms of finance that conflict with group ideology can undermine legitimacy and the 
prospects for recognition, as we discuss below. The fact that Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines generates revenue through 
kidnappings, including of Muslims, detracts from their ideological legitimacy (Weigand 2020). 
13  Furthermore, though beyond the scope of this paper, legitimacy helps us to explain how armed groups tax and what 




illustrate that the taxation practices of the Mai-Mai Kifuafua in Eastern DRC are viewed as 
legitimate because they respect local norms and are ‘subject to a high level of negotiation 
with customary authorities and other local notables’ (Hoffmann et al. 2016: 1451, see also 
Vlassenroot, Mudinga and Musamba 2021). In Southeast Asia, Weigand (2020) shows that 
the extent to which armed groups are concerned about and dependent on local legitimacy 
shapes their economic policies and practices. As discussed above, groups like the KIO/A in 
Myanmar’s Kachin State that are concerned about their local support cannot encourage and 
tax opium production, at least openly, as it is viewed as harmful and destructive locally. 
Instead, the KIO/A taxes what is locally accepted and commonly viewed as legal, such as 
vehicles, shops and other businesses, including those exporting timber and livestock to 
China. Meanwhile, militia groups like the former NDA-K, which relies on support from the 
Myanmar central state and military rather than the local population, can benefit from taxing 
the production of drugs.  
Additionally, and perhaps counterintuitively, taxation can help armed groups build legitimacy 
among civilian populations by enabling public service provision and, possibly, the 
establishment of a form of ‘tacit social contract’ (Podder 2014; Terpstra and Frerks 2017) or 
a ‘social order during wartime’ (Arjona 2016).14 And, indeed, armed groups across the world 
provide public services financed at least in part through taxation. Using the financial 
resources they generate through measures such as taxation, for instance, Afghanistan’s 
Taliban provide justice and conflict resolution (Jackson and Weigand 2020), while Myanmar’s 
KIO/A offers health care and education (Brenner 2015, 2018). Even if taxation is unpopular, it 
allows armed groups to provide services that people need and therefore expand their local 
support. As legitimacy enables taxation and as taxation allows for the provision of services, 
taxation and legitimacy can thus reinforce each other. Similarly, taxation is closely related to 
the regulatory functions of states and proto-states. Where taxation enables an armed group’s 
regulatory authority and functions, it can increase the group’s legitimacy as a ruler.  
The idea of legitimacy being purely transactional, however, has increasingly been called into 
question, particularly through the notion that ‘substantive’ legitimacy, based on values and 
resulting in the belief in an actor’s authority, cannot be ‘bought’ simply by providing public 
goods or services (McCullough 2019, 2020; Weigand 2015, 2017, 2022). Even when 
receiving useful public services from an armed group or another authority, individuals do not 
necessarily believe that the authority has the right to rule. Meanwhile, providing services in a 
way that is perceived to be unfair can undermine an authority’s substantive legitimacy 
(Mcloughlin 2018; Weigand 2022).15 Nonetheless, the provision of services financed by 
taxation is an important aspect of governance, and can allow armed groups to build short-
term civilian support and ‘instrumental’ legitimacy, which can perhaps be transformed into 
more substantive legitimacy over time.  
 
2.3 Institution building 
 
Closely related to legitimacy, taxation represents a bureaucratic function and can thus be a 
means for armed groups to build state-like institutions that strengthen their legitimacy and 
organisational capacity, with implications beyond revenue raising. The literature on taxation 
and state-building makes clear that a common by-product of taxation is institution building. 
As Tilly shows in the case of early modern Europe, ‘within limits… extraction and struggle 
over the means of war created the central organisational structures of the state’. This has 
implications for more than the ability to raise revenue; during conflict, the ‘ability of 
government administrators to establish the routine by which revenues were collected, money 
 
14  See also e.g. Mampilly 2011; Mampilly 2015; Péclard and Mechoulan 2015; Raeymaekers 2011. 
15  This fact can provide both an opportunity and a challenge for armed groups. For instance, corruption in Afghanistan’s 
state justice system increased support for the Taliban over many years (Jackson and Weigand 2020; Weigand 2017). 
However, with growing influence, bureaucratisation and reach, the Taliban justice system has faced similar problems 




raised and supply requisitioned could make the difference between victory and humiliation’ 
(Brewer 1989: 13). The expansion of the bureaucracy was made necessary by taxation – 
with taxation implying a need, for instance, for institutions that can handle information 
gathering, enforcement, and dispute resolution – while an expansion of civilian bureaucracies 
made further taxation necessary (Brautigam 2008; Moore 2004; Fukuyama 2015).16 
 
Similar institution building often arises as a result of taxation by armed groups.17 For 
example, in Somalia, al-Shabaab maintains a considerable ‘shadow government’ that 
enables a highly efficient and centralised taxation system, that is often seen as more 
effective than that of the state (Bryden 2014; S.J. Hansen 2016; Hiraal Institute 2018, 2020; 
Maruf and Joseph 2018; UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2018; van den 
Boogaard and Santoro 2021). Its fiscal bureaucracy includes an intelligence branch, the 
Amniyaat, which enforces collection, as well as two departments, the Zakawaat Office and 
the Finance Office, that collect non-monetary and monetary taxes, respectively. Revenues 
are subsequently shared between headquarters and ministerial regional offices. This 
expansive bureaucracy is costly: the Hiraal Institute (2018) notes that in recent years the 
group’s expenses have ‘ballooned’ as a result of ‘recurring payments to hundreds of officials’, 
including soldiers, police, and administrators, while paying its fighters and administrators to 
retain their loyalty is its utmost budgetary priority. 
While institution building may thus sometimes be a by-product of rather than a primary 
motive for taxation, taxation also represents a means of centralising authority through 
institution building. Bureaucratic institutions often institute a degree of hierarchy, supervision, 
and professionalisation, while the expansion of fiscal institutions may be used as a means of 
extending authority and control. This centralisation of authority may be a driving motive for 
armed groups, with the bureaucratisation enabled by taxation serving to both institute internal 
discipline and to control fragmented or competing sources of authority in a particular territory. 
In Myanmar, for example, the Karen National Union (KNU) – the political organisation of the 
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) – has an extensive bureaucracy, with centralised 
institutions and a hierarchy flowing up to the centre, allowing it to institute a degree of internal 
discipline and control, however imperfect.18 The Finance and Revenue Department maintains 
detailed handbooks outlining tax procedures for its various departments, including agriculture 
and defence, with institutional expansion and coordination critical to its operations (Jolliffe 
2016). For example, procedures for taxing farmland are included in the Agriculture 
Department’s handbooks, with taxes and fees collected in cooperation with other relevant 
departments, including the Forestry Department and the Breeding and Waterways 
Department. Meanwhile, ‘KNU basic organizations’ (ibid.: 22) collect taxes at the village 
level, while also being responsible for organising social services, registering people for party 
membership, and identifying recruits (ibid.).19  
Taxation enables control not just over internal bureaucracies and civilian populations, but 
also over potential threats and competitors to the authority of the armed group. In areas 
 
16  Fukuyama (2015: 265) explains the cycle thusly, ‘resource requirements of long-term warfare... led states to tax their 
citizens, create finance ministries and bureaucracies to administer the tax extraction, build administrative hierarchies to 
manage extensive logistical systems… all of this led to a dramatic expansion of the revenue needs of early modern 
European states in the 17th and 18th centuries, and the growth of civilian bureaucracies.’ 
17  This institution building drive is not, however, universal. For example, despite Abu Sayyaf’s stated aim of creating an 
independent Islamic state in the Philippines, it has not obviously built a bureaucracy, administration, and governing 
institutions – in sharp contrast to other Islamic armed groups in the country, including the MILF and MNLF (Singh and 
Singh 2019; South and Joll 2016).  
18  While the KNU tries to maintain control over this bureaucracy, it is less able to do so where its administration is weak, 
the KNLA has a strong presence, and insecurity is high. In these contexts, less institutionalised forms of taxation and 
revenue extraction are more common, with informal revenues collected by local leaders and armed members of the 
KNLA (Karen Human Rights Group 2018).  
19  Village committees retain 10 per cent of taxes, submitting 90 per cent to the township level. Some of this is remitted to 
the central bureaucracy, but the majority remains in districts in order to finance the salaries of staff and military 




under its control, for instance, al-Shabaab limits local governments’ revenue collection 
capacity,20 while also co-opting clan elders and community leaders in the collection process 
(Hiraal Institute 2018; van den Boogaard and Isak forthcoming).21 For example, Levy and 
Yusuf (2019: 10) explain,  
 
Tribal elders play central roles as community leaders. Al-Shabaab coopts them to keep 
order in the areas under its control. It delegates taxation and policing to elders, who 
have preexisting authority among local populations. In return, al-Shabaab refrains from 
punishing cooperative clans, facilitates arbitration of inter-tribal disputes, and provides 
financial assistance to some clans. 
 
Similarly, armed groups operating in North Kivu in the DRC have been reported to maintain 
the support of local chiefs and government leaders as a means of ensuring broader popular 
support. For instance, in order to ‘uphold its relationship with surrounding communities, the 
ADF sent a significant proportion of the profits accumulated from its timber-related 
businesses [export of timber as well as taxation of timber activities] to local leaders’ (Scorgie-
Porter 2015: 206). In at least one town where timber cutting is prevalent, this reportedly 
amounted to as much as half of the revenue going to Congolese officials (Scorgie-Porter 
2015). More generally, the group’s perceived respect for the traditional hierarchy and local 
leaders is thought to have increased its popular support in some regions.22 This strategy of 
subduing and working with local leaders led to a situation where ‘the ADF was undoubtedly 
the authority in the space it occupied’ (Scorgie-Porter 2015: 209). Similar to the ADF’s 
strategy, the FDLR also reportedly pays off both government officials and local chiefs – 
though they otherwise do not share their taxes from markets, traders, industries, and mining 
with anyone (Romkema 2007: 44). 
 
2.4 Legibility and control of civilian populations 
 
Enabled by the institution building impetus, armed group taxation can contribute to the 
accumulation of information about populations and support authorities’ ability to control 
behaviour, as with state taxation. The design, planning, collection, accounting, and auditing 
of taxation requires an enormous amount of information about the taxed population.23 Certain 
taxes require intelligence on the location and number of businesses, individuals and 
households; their incomes; foreign and domestic transactions; and their eligibility for various 
exemptions. Information requirements increase with the complexity of taxation. 
Consequently, taxation generates a need for a substantial amount of information, as well as 
a justification for the creation of an apparatus that collects and manages this information. 
Indeed, the history of taxation and state-building is closely connected to the history of states’ 
 
20  In particular, where taxpayers already have to pay taxes to al-Shabaab, some local governments report feeling limited in 
collecting additional revenues because of the extra burden it would imply for taxpayers – while also being physically 
limited in collecting taxes where there is high insecurity or a risk of retaliation by al-Shabaab (van den Boogaard and 
Isak forthcoming). 
21  Of course, this co-optation does not necessarily imply consent by the broader civilian population or broader support for 
al-Shabaab. In some instances, cooperation is a strategic choice by communities in the face of violent threats. 
22  In 2011, Congolese military officers estimated that the ADF ‘benefits from the popular support of nearly half of the 
population of Beni territory’ (UNSC 2011: 30), at least in part because ADF ‘combatants and their family members are 
relatively well integrated and generally respect the traditional hierarchy in the host communities’ (Romkema 2007: 29). 
Indeed, local chiefs assisted them in their tax collection from traders (Scorgie-Porter 2015: 197). This assistance and 
peaceful co-existence, however, was not universal, with some local chiefs feeling more threatened by the group and 
some evidence in other areas that the rebels wanted to assert great power over the chiefs and no longer pay taxes to 
them (Romkema 2007: 68–69). More recent violence in the region, including massacres of civilians, has further 
undermined its support, leading to civil society protests (Mastaki 2019). 
23  Hatfield 2015 highlights, for instance, that despite the public attention to the information that the US national security 





and empires’ efforts to make populations, economic activity and land ‘legible’ to the 
apparatus of government (Scott 1998).24  
 
Similar to states, armed groups can then use the increased legibility of populations to support 
other objectives. For instance, they might be interested in gathering additional information on 
populations to identify areas with higher numbers of potential recruits or even to institute a 
draft or conscription system. They might seek out particular demographic or economic 
information to identify likely strongholds of support or opposition or to identify what strategies 
for revenue extraction might be most efficient. Unsurprisingly, the links between taxation and 
legibility are most obvious where armed groups have developed larger and more 
comprehensive administrative systems – illustrating the close relationship between 
information and institution building. Groups such as Hezbollah or ISIS, for example, are 
widely described to have developed complex administrative systems, with tax extraction 
enabled by administrative information collection and legibility (al-Tamimi 2015), with taxes 
allowing them to ‘see like a state’, so to say (Scott 1998). Similarly, al-Shabaab keeps a list 
of business owners and an estimate of their worth to facilitate tax assessment and collection, 
in both territory that it controls and territory that it doesn’t (Hiraal Institute 2018).  
Closely related to the connection between taxation and legibility are the aforementioned links 
between taxation and the control of populations, behaviour, and economic activity (Heer 
1937). For one, taxation can be used to control the physical movement of populations and 
goods, as through taxes levied at roadblocks and checkpoints. As Schouten (2019, 2021) 
highlighted in his account of ‘roadblock politics’, roadblocks such as those operated by the 
M23 rebel group in Congo’s North Kivu province do not only provide armed groups with an 
income. Instead, they also provide control over key bottlenecks of local trade routes and the 
associated circulations of both goods and people – providing a ‘logistical form of power’ and 
expanding common conceptions of control that focus on territory more narrowly.  
Similarly, and closely linked to the discussion of ideology and legitimacy above, armed 
groups may use taxation as a means of controlling populations and the economy through the 
sanction of particular behaviour, such as trading with or selling to out-groups. For example, 
Revkin (2020) describes the use of border taxes by ISIS as designed to disincentivise 
civilians leaving the territory (and to benefit from them staying), outlining an illustrative use of 
a tax in order to control a population. Similarly, civilians were encouraged to enlist into armed 
service by making those who refused to enlist pay a ‘tax in lieu of jihad’ (Revkin 2020). In the 
case of the eastern DRC, Hoffmann et al. (2016) also observe how taxes play a wider 
symbolic role for establishing relationships of control between citizens and armed groups in a 
context where territorial boundaries are often complex, noting that ‘taxes establish mutual 
obligations between armed groups and residents. They are constitutive for the establishment 
of the boundaries of the political community and public authority. In this sense they are 
constitutive of both citizenship and jurisdiction.’ Civilians are not without agency in this 
process. They often attempt, sometimes successfully, to influence and shape the nature of 
armed group control and policies at the local level. For instance, Jackson (2021) illustrates 
how communities in Afghanistan negotiate their relationship with the Taliban, including with 
regard to taxation. Poor farmers often had the best leverage, using tactics, such as pleading 
relative poverty, to elicit sympathy and leveraging the collective power of community elders 
to help negotiate down insurgent taxes. In numerous cases, the Taliban relented, at least 
temporarily, or reduced its demands where it encountered organised, steadfast resistance. 
Taxation may further be used to control the economy, including through attempts to influence 
consumption behaviour through taxes on goods like tobacco or sugar, as well as more 
 
24  The first cadastral surveys, for example, trace their origins to the need of local rulers to increase tax yield from land, and 
have since been a site of contestation about legibility (Sánchez-Talanquer 2020). Legibility typically refers to states’ 
possession of information, but also how this information is structured and aggregated in ways that make it 




comprehensive attempts to shape economic policy and policy through measures like tax 
incentives. Formal state taxation is habitually analysed in the context of wider economic 
policy, as setting not just the space for redistribution and investment, but as being a central 
element in strategic industrial policy and business-state relationships. While they might not 
explicitly attempt import substitution industrialisation or similar strategies, armed groups still 
occasionally develop an active interest in regulating local economies. This can be as an 
element of a wider strategic engagement with the population, for example to lower prices for 
essential goods; in the context of armed groups’ own involvement in economic enterprises, 
including to target firms owned by rival groups; or to strategically subsidise economic 
activities seen as desirable. One such example is the short-lived Armed Forces of the 
Congolese People (Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais, FAPC) in eastern Congo. As 
discussed by Titeca (2011), the group was reliant on connection with local traders in order to 
gain access to income from lootable goods. Consequently, the group purposefully used tax 
policy, including a simplified ‘pre-payment system’ as well as low and predictable rates, in 
order to attract traders, seeking to create a ‘Monaco’ in Eastern Congo (Titeca 2011: 52).  
 
2.5 Performing public authority 
 
While the bureaucratic and institution building enabled by taxation may thus help to further 
the objectives of an armed group, the very existence of a fiscal bureaucracy also serves the 
purpose of reinforcing groups’ authority through their association with symbols of statehood. 
Taxation is associated with legitimate statehood; armed group taxation is consequently often 
highly symbolic and can be viewed as an attempt to act like a state in order to construct 
state-like legitimacy in the eyes of local, national and international audiences. By ‘doing what 
states do’ and using the ‘symbols of statehood’ through the levying of taxes on the 
populations under their control (Hagmann and Péclard 2010; T.B. Hansen and Stepputat 
2001; Lund 2006; Hoffmann et al. 2016; Huang 2016; Mampilly 2015; Reno 2015; Tull 2003), 
armed groups may support claims of being legitimate de facto states.  
 
As Hoffmann et al. (2016: 1436) note, ‘taxation practices of armed groups – consciously or 
unconsciously – draw upon, mobilize, evoke and perform the language of stateness when 
they tax people.’ In the context of armed group taxation, symbols of statehood often manifest 
through the giving of official-looking receipts. For instance, reports indicate that the Taliban’s 
‘Department of Tax and Revenue’ issues receipts for taxes levied on goods being 
transported through checkpoints (Kumar 2018); al-Shabaab issues official receipts for a 
variety of the taxes it levies, including on transiting vehicles, transported goods, farms and 
agricultural produces, and livestock sales (Hiraal Institute 2020; UN Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea 2018); while in the CAR, the UPC issues receipts for taxes paid on the 
purchase and transport of livestock as well as on goods leaving the region under their control 
as ‘customs’ taxes (Jaillon et al. 2017). In some ways, therefore, the building of a fiscal 
bureaucracy reflects a type of isomorphic mimicry (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2017), 
with armed groups effectively mimicking the states with which they frequently are at war (A. 
Jackson 2018; Stokke 2006).25  
In the DRC, for example, Hoffmann et al. (2016: 1434) note that armed groups’ tax practices 
are ‘based on long-standing registers of authority and practices of rule that originate in the 
colonial era’, with taxation ‘at the core of armed groups’ production of public authority and 
citizenship’. Taxation in this context is embedded in the ‘language of stateness’ (T.B. Hansen 
and Stepputat 2001: 8), reflected through public signs, rituals and spectacles. Some Mai-Mai 
groups, for example, have framed themselves in relation to pre-colonial empires and 
consequently situate taxation as a necessary contribution to the restoration of state authority. 
The groups invoke ‘the principle of national sovereignty’ in order ‘to mobilize large segments 
 
25  Of relevance to thinking about armed group taxation, Andrews et al. (2017: 31) note that ‘mimicry often conflates form 




of the population to contribute monetary and in-kind taxes’ (Hoffmann et al. 2016: 1447), with 
one such Mai-Mai group creating local revenue mobilisation units (comités de soutien), 
‘echoing practices of the [post-colonial] Mobutu state’ (Hoffmann et al. 2016: 1447; Hoffmann 
2015).  
The performance of statehood may be targeted at domestic or international audiences. 
Internationally, taxation is not only viewed as a legitimate practice of states; the right to 
collect taxes is also largely limited to states. Calls for international recognition of de facto 
states, for instance, often justify polities’ ‘stateness’ according to their fiscal and 
administrative capacity (see e.g. The Economist 2021). Hence, by collecting taxes, armed 
groups emphasise their claim to legitimate statehood. Attention may be paid to international 
audiences not only for the objective of statehood recognition, but to demonstrate support for 
particular ideas or global movements; indeed, ‘adopting a particular approach to taxation can 
be a signal to an external audience, which is trying to slot an organization into various 
categories based on their perceived fealty to broader ideological concerns’ (Mampilly 2021: 
96). 
Domestically, meanwhile, taxation can be a means of asserting authority over civilian 
populations, convincing civilians of the legitimacy of that authority, or demonstrating power 
and capacity in relation to the formal state. Indeed, as we discuss above, introducing taxes in 
a newly captured territory may be a means of normalising a new form of rule, while taxation 
based on a reciprocal fiscal social contract may be a means of winning the support of civilian 
populations. As Mampilly (2015) argues, symbolic processes can influence an armed group’s 
relationship with civilians both by fostering greater identification and ties of legitimacy and by 
reinforcing civilian perceptions of the coercive power of the group, reducing its need to rely 
on enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance (see also Mampilly 2021: 84–5). In line 
with this, Sweet (2020: 1) argues that armed groups’ projection of a ‘state-like image is more 
than a simple veneer’, but further enables support and capacity to wage conflict. For 
example, in part because of the documentation it provides and the willingness to respond to 
disputes, there is evidence that some traders deliberately take transport routes under al-
Shabaab control rather than government-controlled routes, with al-Shabaab taxation viewed 
as more predictable and less likely to result in double taxation (UN Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea 2018). Meanwhile, in the eastern DRC, the Mai-Mai Kifuafua used 
‘practical and symbolic registers of authority and languages of stateness’ in order to gain 
popular support, framing itself as a ‘state within a state’, with taxation justified in exchange 
for the security it could provide for community members (Hoffmann 2016: 1451).  
At the same time, armed groups may use taxation as a means of demonstrating their equal 
or greater competency and legitimacy to raise taxes in relation to political opponents, such as 
the de jure state that they are frequently fighting. For example, in 2016, the Taliban’s central 
leadership formally demanded a tax of 10 per cent on telecommunication companies two 
months after the Afghan government announced impressive new revenues from an 
increased tax on telecommunications operators at the same rate. An individual in the Quetta 
Shura, the Taliban’s leadership council, justified the parallel tax by saying ‘It is our right to tax 
you if you want us to protect your [transmission] towers around Afghanistan’ (cited in Chopra 
2016). The performative importance of taxation is even more striking in cases of such 
imitation where the revenues from new taxes are minimal or non-existent. For example, in 
Kunduz province, the Taliban levies charges on electricity that probably result in the group 
losing money, as noted above. It still levies them, however, and goes to the trouble of 
manufacturing bills that are in some cases ‘near-replicas’ of the bills produced by the state-
owned electricity company, going ‘to a great deal of effort to mimic official systems’ (A. 
Jackson 2018: 23). 
 
As noted above, requiring government officials to pay taxes is another way for armed groups 




notes that in Sri Lanka the LTTE exercised ‘considerable influence on state institutions and 
officials in the government-controlled parts of the northeast province’, while in Somalia al-
Shabaab demonstrates its authority and power by levying taxes on government officials, 
including top commanders of the Somali National Army that are not in direct danger from the 
group (Hiraal Institute 2020: 6–7). As discussed above, armed groups like the LTTE in Sri 
Lanka and the Naxalites in India taxed government officials and contractors more than 
others, thereby emphasising their own authority vis-à-vis the government. The act of levying 
taxes can thus reinforce the claim of armed groups that they are the only legitimate authority 
with a monopoly over revenue extraction. Similarly, armed groups may also attempt to 
impose control over external actors, including the international community. For example, 
armed groups such as the Taliban, ISIS and al-Shabaab have taxed international 
development or humanitarian assistance (see e.g. Bowden 2021). While there are clear 
revenue motives for doing so, these taxes also help them to illustrate groups’ authority in a 
given region. 
Meanwhile, the trappings of a fiscal bureaucracy may also be an attempt to assert 
sovereignty and supplement claims of statehood. For instance, in late 2019, when the 
Arakan Army in Myanmar announced the formation of the Rakhine People’s Authority to levy 
taxes on businesses in order to fund its military and political operations and administer areas 
under its control, it framed taxation as a legitimate means of founding a new form of 
government that would re-establish the historic Arakan nation that had existed centuries 
earlier (Radio Free Asia 2020). While the new taxing authority is obviously motivated in part 
by revenue, observers note that ‘its creation is probably more important as a demonstration 
of the group’s de facto authority and territorial control and assertion of its legitimacy’ 
(International Crisis Group 2020). This reflects a common strategy and motivation of other 
groups in the region and beyond. Similarly, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia 
levied the ‘Pajak Nanggrow’, roughly translating to ‘state tax’ – a clear indication of the 
group’s objectives for state-based autonomy (Aspinall 2009).  
These performative acts of statehood are particularly important in the contemporary context 
given norms of territorial sovereignty and the limitations of state formation in the global order 
(e.g. Bates 2008; R. Jackson 1995; Sørensen 2001; Spruyt 2009). Indeed, building states in 
the early 21st century is a very different endeavour than it was in the early modern Europe 
that Tilly (1985) and Olson (1993) documented. Armed groups that seek to engage in state-
building today do so in the context of a state system that is more consolidated, territorialised, 
and globalised, and that has itself embraced the Weberian notion of a state as one with an 
established monopoly over coercion and commonly frames non-state governance as a form 
of disorder, insecurity and an existential threat. The nature of the post-WWII global order 
implies different requirements for modern would-be stationary bandits, including engagement 
with international norms and conventions and global narratives around autonomy and self-
determination.26 While having the trappings of statehood may not be a sufficient condition for 
de facto statehood, it may at least be a necessary one. 
Even with these limitations, there are a range of ways in which armed group taxation can be 
motivated by an interest in building relationships with civilian populations and projecting 
authority, thereby establishing legitimacy with both domestic and external audiences. Of 
course, however, and in line with the recognition of the diverse objectives of armed groups, 
some groups profess no explicit agenda to build a state, secede from a state or at some 
point hold an exclusive monopoly on the use of force, legitimate or not, in a particular 
 
26  Most critically, it means that for many armed groups, institution building is, at least in the medium term, going to occur in 
a constrained sense, and in close interaction with states. The PKK in particular offers an expansive case study on these 
dynamics. Meanwhile, following institution building and a military offensive the Taliban successfully captured the Afghan 




territory.27 This does not mean that these armed groups do not engage in institution building, 
that they do not care about building legitimacy or complex administrative structures; rather, 
these means may lead to ends other than de facto statehood.28 At the same time, it is 
important to recognise that a group’s short and long-term objectives may differ, while its 
objectives around statehood or public authority may shift over time.29 
 
 
3  Conclusions 
 
As we have shown throughout this paper, armed group taxation can be motivated by more 
than just the opportunity to raise revenue. Specifically, armed groups can use taxation to 
execute ideology, build legitimacy, develop institutions, increase their control over civilian 
populations, and to perform and project public authority. In line with Mampilly (2021: 88), we 
show that ‘reducing rebel taxation to a purely economic bargaining logic fails to situate it 
within the broader social and political contexts that many scholars of taxation and state 
power emphasise’. We thus contribute to debates about the role of greed in motivating 
armed groups in conflict, as well as to a growing literature on rebel governance (e.g. Arjona, 
Kasfir and Mampilly 2015; Furlan 2020). We show that taxation can enable service provision 
and rebel governance and can thus shape the relationships between armed groups and 
civilian populations and the underlying legitimacy of armed groups’ authority. At the same 
time, we contribute to debates about the nature and boundaries of informal and formal 
taxation, illustrating the ways in which armed group taxation intentionally imitates state 
taxation and can thus not simply be classified as extortion. This is in line with the idea that 
‘the distinction between state and non-state actors, and between state and non-state war 
economies, is in large part elusive’ as ‘the methods of wealth accumulation and their social 
impact… bear surprising resemblances’ to state and non-state groups (Di Cosmo et al. 2021: 
5). 
 
While our findings contribute to theoretical understanding of armed groups, conflict, and 
state-building, they also raise important questions for future research. We highlight three 
areas in particular where we believe further research would be beneficial. First, given the 
complexity in delineating the distinctions between taxation and extortion, future research 
could usefully further explore the language used to describe taxation and the meaning that is 
embedded within such language. While journalistic accounts often use the terminology of 
‘extortion’ and aid organisations often refer to the payments as ‘levies’ in an effort to not 
legitimise them, our exploration of non-revenue motives for taxation, especially those related 
to legitimacy and state-building, indicate that these descriptors may not always provide the 
full story. At the same time, the description of ‘taxation’ by armed groups that rely heavily on 
coercion or the threat of violence to collect taxes may likewise not be appropriate. 
Accordingly, there is a need for greater conceptual clarity when describing revenue 
extraction by armed groups, with attention being paid to both how armed groups describe 
and taxpayers perceive the levies. Understanding civilian perspectives here will be central to 
better understanding the nature and legitimacy of armed group revenue extraction. 
 
27  Some groups may in fact be primarily driven by economic motives, may limit their activity to supporting a political goal in 
a different territory, might seek to influence politics within an existing state system, to capture power within it or to 
change it, or might solely seek to maximise revenue.  
28  This could include what some scholars refer to as ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009), with 
armed groups seeking to don the mantle of some state authority in the sense described by Lund’s ‘twilight institutions’, 
or more explicitly following the institutional blueprint of a legal political organisation within a state, by forming a political 
party. 
29  In the context of formal states, a fitting analogy might be separate states that still express their reunification with a 
neighbouring state as an overarching priority while engaging in separate institution building – such as South and North 
Korea or the former East and West Germany. This points to the importance of additional analysis of the potential 
tensions between medium and long term group objectives, while critically highlighting the importance of recognising the 





Second, and building on both the ‘resource curse’ literature (Ross 2004; Ross 2015) and the 
tax and accountability literature (Moore 2004; Prichard 2015), future research could usefully 
explore whether and how variation in tax practices relates to the non-tax revenues available 
to an armed group and how such practices influence the relationship with civilian populations 
(Sarkar and Sarkar 2017). If armed groups receive revenues from natural resources, state 
sponsors, or the diaspora, do they retain non-revenue incentives to tax?30 At the same time, 
the contexts in which armed groups choose not to tax requires greater exploration. For 
instance, as noted above, when AQIM took control of Timbuktu, Mali in 2012, it abolished 
customs, duties, tools and tariffs as an apparent means of building favour with local 
residents; likewise, the AQIM-offshoot MUJAO abolished taxes in areas it governed, 
reportedly to gain favour with local populations (Fanusie and Entz 2017). What do such 
instances of non-taxation imply for the relationship between armed groups and local 
populations and how do they relate to the availability of non-tax revenue sources? 
 
Third, building on the broader literature linking conflict to taxation and state-building (Centeno 
1997, 2002; Tilly 1992), future research should explore the relationship between conflict 
intensity and taxation. Taking into consideration the fiscal imperatives of war-making and the 
link between territorial control and capacity to tax, how does the nature of conflict affect 
armed group taxing practices, including the type, rate, and target of levies and the language 
that is used by groups to describe and justify their taxes? Exploring this question has 
particularly important implications for understanding relationships with civilian populations, 
social order during wartime, and state-building processes.  
 
The findings, perspectives and questions discussed here likewise have important policy 
implications. Crucially, this paper has illustrated that armed groups do not only tax to 
maximise revenue generation. Policymakers need to consider the political dimensions that 
underpin many of the economic decisions of armed groups, including their taxation policies. 
While groups such as the Taliban tax international organisations to illustrate their authority, 
the Houthis in Yemen retreated from their plan of taxing international aid organisations after 
the extent to which it would strain their relationship with the international community became 
clear (BBC 2020). This shows that international actors can have leverage on armed group 
taxation strategies, with high political costs for armed groups having the potential to outweigh 
the financial benefits in some cases. As many armed groups aspire to statehood, they aim to 
be seen to perform functions of legitimate public authority. Humanitarian organisations could 
exert influence over armed groups by taking their statehood claims seriously. Beyond 
reminding armed groups of their obligations as parties to a conflict under international 
humanitarian law, humanitarian organisations could point out to armed groups that states 
typically do not tax charitable and aid organisations.31  
 
Furthermore, it would be wrong for policymakers to assume that the payment of taxes to 
armed groups necessarily indicates either coercion or support for this group. Many armed 
groups, just like states, have successfully established institutions that normalise the payment 
of levies and even use taxation to build local legitimacy without explicit coercion. 
Nonetheless, armed group taxation, like all taxation, is typically still backed by the potential of 
coercion. Hence, the payment of taxes by civilians to an armed group does not necessarily 
indicate support for the group either. Due to the often-structured nature of armed group 
taxation, civilians frequently keep the receipts issued by armed groups, enabling them to 
 
30  While some have considered the relationship between financing sources and armed group relationships with civilian 
populations, these have, to the best of our knowledge, excluded an explicit exploration of armed group taxation.  
31  According to Art 61 of the Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians (1949) ‘Such consignments shall be exempt 
in occupied territory from all charges, taxes or customs duties unless these are necessary in the interests of the 
economy of the territory. The Occupying Power shall facilitate the rapid distribution of these consignments. All 
Contracting Parties shall endeavour to permit the transit and transport, free of charge, of such relief consignments on 




prove that they have paid the necessary levies on their business or goods. While such 
receipts are often used as evidence for the support of an armed group by opposing 
governments – for instance, by the army in Myanmar that uses such receipts as evidence to 
arrest people on the basis of the Unlawful Associations Act (India Act XIV 1908) that 
criminalises contact with armed groups such as the KIO/A – they in fact often only illustrate 
the pragmatic behaviour of civilians who want to avoid being taxed repeatedly. As described 
by the Hiraal Institute (2020: 6), ‘payment to [al-Shabaab] has little to do with recognizing the 
legitimacy of the group but more to do with the practicality of real life, which makes it 
impossible to conduct business in areas where the group has operational presence’ (Hiraal 
Institute 2020: 6). 
 
While this paper has shown the diversity of armed group taxation strategies, underpinned by 
different drivers and motives, more research needs to be done to unpack these dynamics 
and to develop a more structured understanding of the taxation strategies of different types 
of armed groups. More work to expand both the breadth of cases as well as the depth of 
information on armed groups’ taxation should be prioritised. The findings of such research 
could help policymakers that engage with armed groups to mediate peace agreements, to 







List of the cases included in this review  
 
Name of Group Country Years Active 
Al-Shabaab Somalia 2007-Present 
The Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) Southern Thailand 1963-Present 
Cammora Italy 17th Century-
Present 
Fources Nouvelles de Cote d'Ivoire (FNI) Cote d'Ivoire 2002-2011 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) Northern Ireland 1969-2005 
Shining Path/Communist Party of Peru Peru 1969-1992 
Taliban, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Afghanistan; Pakistan 1994-Present 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/IS/ISIL/Daesh) Western Iraq; Eastern Syria 1999-Present 
Hay-at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)  Syria 2017-Present 
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)  Turkey 1978-Present 
Seleka Central African Republic 2012-Present 
Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) Central African Republic 2014-Present 
al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Algeria; Mauritania; Mali 2007-Present 
Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) Algeria; Mauritania; Mali 2017-Present 
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) Algeria; Mauritania; Mali 2011-2015 
Hezbollah Lebanon 1982-Present 
Hamas Palestine; Israel 1987-Present 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Colombia 1964-2016 
National Liberation Army (ELN) Colombia 1966-Present 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Sri Lanka 1976-2009 
Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan 2007-Present 
New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K) Myanmar 1989-2009 
Ta'ang National Liberation Army Myanmar 1992-Present 
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Myanmar 1949-Present 
Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A) Myanmar 1960-Present 
Karen National Union (KNU) Myanmar 1947-Present 
Shan State Army – North Myanmar 1964-Present 
Shan State Army – South Myanmar 1996-Present 
United Wa State Army Myanmar 1989-Present 
Arakan Army (AA) Myanmar 2009-Present 




Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army 
(CPP-NPA) 
Philippines 1969-Present 
Abu Sayyaf Group Philippines 1991-Present 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Philippines 1977-Present 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Philippines 1972-Present 
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) Philippines 2010-Present 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Uganda; DRC 1996-Present 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) 
Angola 1966-2002 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) DRC; Uganda 1987-Present 
M23 DRC 2012-2013 
National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) DRC 2006-2009 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) DRC; Rwanda 2000-Present 
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) DRC 1998-2006 
Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) DRC 1998-2003 
Communist Party of India (Maoist) – People's Liberation 
Guerilla Army 
India 2000-Present 
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